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Abstract 
This paper was originally written for Professor Alexander Moens’ POL 484, 
NATO Field School, Simulation and Experiential Learning Program. The assignment 
asked students to write a research paper not to exceed 3000 words on questions 
pertaining to defence policy, military affairs, NATO, international crisis 
management, multilateral cooperation, Alliance relations, defence spending, peace 
and security, multinational operations, NATO-UN or NATO-EU/AU 
cooperation, etc. Papers were expected to incorporate original research, and 
include an introduction, literature review, theoretical framework, methodology, 
and references. This paper uses Chicago citation style.  
 
Introduction  
In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the doctrine 
of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a political commitment recognizing the 
obligation of sovereign states to prevent and protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.1 Corollary to 
this commitment was the international agreement to help states exercise this 
responsibility by diplomatic and non-violent means. Although this principle was 
largely rooted in pre-existing international agreements, it has nevertheless created 
a novel framework by which humanitarian interventions may be evaluated. In 
recent years, the perceived legitimacy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) as enforcers of R2P has increased, especially as all other measures have 
                                                 
1 "United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect." United 
Nations. Accessed June 08, 2018. http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-
responsibility-to-protect.html. 
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largely been deemed insufficient.2 Although the authority of the UN as the 
primary actors in humanitarian operations has not been challenged, it has in 
recent years become evident that the UN lacks the military capacity, and the 
Security Council consensus, to fully enforce peacekeeping missions in volatile 
areas. As such, when states fail their populations, a considerable degree of the 
responsibility to protect falls upon NATO’s shoulders. Although the North 
Atlantic Treaty of 1949 makes no international commitment to the safeguarding 
of states and populations outside of NATO’s borders3, it is not unprecedented for 
NATO to act on request of the UN during cases of large-scale humanitarian 
crisis. As such, it becomes imperative to evaluate NATO’s effectiveness and 
decision-making in these situations: is NATO’s severity of response impacted by civilian 
suffering? In this essay I will consider NATO-led operations commencing after the 
enactment of R2P, and situate the findings within the normative question 
concerning NATO’s status as a legitimate enforcer of the doctrine.  
 
Literature Review  
Criticisms of NATO’s humanitarian expeditions have been plentiful prior to the 
enactment of R2P, and have only been intensified by the controversial results of 
Operation Unified Protector in Libya.4 Since then, doubts of NATO’s ability to 
deliver on its end-state solutions have only multiplied, unmitigated by the paucity 
of other international actors capable of delivering reliable solutions to large-scale 
humanitarian crises. While most agree that R2P has achieved relative normative 
success, the majority also concurs that the question of who holds legitimate right 
to enact the doctrine is extremely contestable.5 Andrea Carati argues that “NATO 
cannot be a solution to the problem of who should intervene, even though its 
interventions can be occasionally consistent with R2P principles,” and further 
highlights the inconsistencies between NATO’s mission statements of protecting 
                                                 
2 NATO. "The Responsibility to Protect." NATO. Accessed June 08, 2018. 
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/Managing-Crisis/Responsibility-
protect/EN/index.htm. 
3 NATO. "The North Atlantic Treaty." NATO. Accessed June 08, 2018. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm. 
4 Cock, Chris De. "Operations Unified Protector and the Protection of Civilians in 
Libya." Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 14 (July 26, 2012): 213-35. 
5 Bellamy, Alex J. "From Tripoli to Damascus? Lesson Learning and the Implementation of the 
Responsibility to Protect." International Politics 51, no. 1 (2014): 23-44. 
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civilians and end results.6 Other criticisms follow in a similar construction, 
targeting the discrepancy between stated objectives and manifest outcomes, and 
additionally, systemic inadequacies in NATO’s design as an international military 
alliance to enact humanitarian missions.7 However, there is a neglect of 
consideration towards the intent of a mission, the decision-making processes 
behind it, and the relationship between force employed and the risk of civilian 
casualty. Such an evaluation will impact our perception of NATO’s status as a 
legitimate actor enforcing R2P, and influence our understanding of limitations in 
global peacekeeping as a whole.  
 
Theoretical Framework  
In my research, I will consider the severity of NATO’s responses to volatile and 
violent situations as a function of quantity of civilian suffering, expecting a 
positive correlation between these two variables. As an institution partially 
deriving its legitimacy of intervention through the doctrine of R2P, and 
possessing core values reflective of it, it follows that NATO would react in a 
manner demonstrative of such values. If there exists in fact a positive relationship 
in NATO-led missions after 2005 between severity of response and risk of civilian 
suffering, we can expect to observe that the greater the loss and displacement of 
civilian life, the more serious the response. If alternatively, there is a negative 
relationship, we can expect to observe that the greater the loss and displacement 
of civilian life, the less serious the response. If there is in fact no correlation 
between these two variables, then there should be no connection between severity 
of response and civilian casualty, and neither can be reliably used as predictors of 
the other. The scope of this paper will be merely to establish a correlational 
relationship, and will not seek to make higher burden claims towards causality. 
 
Methodology 
Under my research, I will divide NATO’s responses into three continuous 
categories of severity, ranging from low severity response, moderate severity 
response, to high severity response, which are calculated with consideration to 
factors including presence of ground troops, quantity of forces, quantity of heavy 
                                                 
6 Carati, Andrea. "Responsibility to Protect, NATO and the Problem of Who Should Intervene: 
Reassessing the Intervention in Libya." Global Change, Peace & Security 29, no. 3 (2017): 293-
309. 
7 Zilkiq, Adelina. "Kosovo - a ''Humanitarian Intervention'': A Case Study about Kosovo and 
Nato's Intervention on 24 March, 1999." 2012. 
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equipment, and duration of operations. While it would have been preferable to 
obtain consistent data for cost of operations, NATO’s burden sharing model calls 
for member states to individually address costs incurred during deployment from 
use of personnel and equipment, and the specifics of such information are often 
classified. Additionally, the costs subject to common funding involve mostly 
administrative costs, which cannot be taken as an appropriate factor in NATO’s 
severity of response. Civilian suffering will be divided into two subcategories: 
number of casualties and number of displaced peoples.  
While NATO has since the 1990s engaged in R2P-esque operations in the 
pursuit of humanitarian security, beginning with the Operation Allied Goodwill in 
19928, the cases after the ratification of R2P are particularly impactful, as the 
newly instituted normative framework contributed to the strengthened perception 
of NATO as a legitimate actor in humanitarian crises. As such, the exclusive 
analysis on NATO operations beginning after 2005 is justified.  
The limitations on this research design are to be factored into the 
generalizability of the results – in particular, this kind of evaluation on NATO’s 
behaviour neglects to consider (i) the support missions that NATO engages in 
exclusively for the purpose of humanitarian aid, which do not involve military 
action, such as the earthquake relief mission in Pakistan in 2005, and assistance 
efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina9, and (ii) the numerous conflicts 
involving humanitarian crises within NATO’s sphere of operation, in which 
NATO has deliberately chosen not to respond. With regards to the first 
limitation, while it does impact considerations towards NATO’s overall telos, it 
should be emphasized that the scope of my research concerns uniquely NATO-
led missions, and explicitly excludes actions in which NATO merely plays a 
supporting role. This is because missions in which NATO holds a primary role 
better indicators of NATO’s moral direction, as when in a supporting role, 
NATO is restricted by the aims of its collaborators and hence cannot entirely 
manifest its own objective. The second limitation will be addressed with a 
separate analysis of possible explanatory models for why NATO chooses to not 
respond, which will be situated in the overall guiding framework of enforcing 
R2P.  
 
                                                 
8 Pike, John. "NATO Operations." Nato's Operations Past and Present. Accessed June 08, 2018. 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/nato-ops.htm. 
9 NATO. "Operations and Missions: Past and Present." NATO. Accessed June 08, 2018. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_52060.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
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Case Selection 
Five operations thus far have been both NATO-led and commenced after the 
enactment of the R2P doctrine: Operation Allied Provider (2008), Operation 
Allied Protector (2009), Operation Ocean Shield (2009-2016), Operation Unified  
Protector (2011), and Operation Resolute Support (2015-ongoing).10 Operation 
Allied Provider, Allied Protector, and Ocean Shield all took place in waters in and 
surrounding the Gulf of Aden and targeted increased levels of piracy activities 
that threatened international trading routes and initially, the delivery of UN 
humanitarian goods. NATO exited the Gulf of Aden in 2016 with the conclusion 
of Operation Ocean Shield, and reported this operation to be a 
success.11 More controversially, NATO engaged in the Libyan crisis in March of 
2011 following the popular uprising against the Gadhafi regime, under UN 
Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Seven months later, following the success of rebel 
forces in capturing and killing Gadhafi, NATO retreated from Libya, claiming to 
have reached its objectives.12 In 2015, Operation Resolute Support, a non-combat 
training mission providing assistance and advice to Afghan security forces and 
government institutions, succeeded the International Security and Assistance 
Force (ISAF, 2003-2014) as NATO’s primary operation in Afghanistan.13  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 NATO. "Counter-piracy Operations (Archived)." NATO. Accessed August 08, 2018. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_48815.htm. 
12 NATO. "NATO and Libya (Archived)." NATO. November 9, 2015. Accessed June 08, 2018. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_71652.htm. 
13 Support, Resolute. "NATO Resolute Support | Home." NATO Resolute Support | Afghan 
National Army Trust Fund. Accessed August 08, 2018. https://rs.nato.int/. 
Helen Han Wei Luo  6 
 
 
SLC Writing Contest – 2018  
 
   
 
 
Chart 1. Severity of Response  
 
 
                                                 
14 NATO. "Counter-piracy Operations (Archived)." NATO. Accessed August 08, 2018. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_48815.htm. 
15It can be assumed that the number of NATO troops deployed in both Operation Allied 
Protector and Operation Allied Provider do not exceed 800, as both operations were comparable 
to Operation Ocean Shield in mission statement and objectives 
and involved considerably less naval assets than Operation Ocean Shield.  
16 NATO. "Counter-piracy Operations (Archived)." NATO. Accessed August 08, 2018. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_48815.htm. 
17 Ibid.  
18 NATO. Public Diplomacy Division. "Operation Unified Protector Final Mission Stats." News 
release, November 02, 2011. Accessed August 8, 2018. 
19 NATO. "Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan." NATO. Accessed August 09, 2018. 
https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_113694.htm. 
Operation  Duration Presence of 
Ground 
Troops  
Quantity 
of forces  
Heavy 
Equipment 
Severity of 
Response  
Operation 
Allied 
Provider 
(2008) 
3 months  No Data not 
available  
7 naval 
assets14 
low severity 
response  
Operation 
Allied 
Protector 
(2009) 
6 months  No Data not 
available15  
10 naval 
assets16 
low severity 
response 
Operation 
Ocean 
Shield 
(2009-
2016) 
89 
months  
No 800 
troops  
32 naval 
assets17 
moderate 
severity 
response 
Operation 
Unified 
Protector 
(2011) 
7 months  No 8000 
troops  
260 air assets 
21 naval 
assets18 
high 
severity 
response 
Operation 
Resolute 
Support 
(2015-
present) 
44 
months 
(ongoing, 
commitment 
continues to 
2020) 
Yes 16 000 
troops 19 
Data not 
available  
high 
severity 
response  
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The categories of severity of response were measured based on a 
combined consideration for duration of operations, presence of ground troops, 
quantity of forces, and quantity of heavy equipment, giving reasonable attention 
to the lacuna in data. While the categories themselves may be arbitrary as 
standalone data, my purpose is to compare NATO responses against themselves 
and determine if NATO adjusts its severity of response as a function of human 
suffering. As such, it is merely important to note that Operation Allied Provider 
and Operation Allied Protector are comparable in severity of response due to 
similar duration of operations and quantity of heavy equipment, that Operation 
Ocean Shield is more severe due to its extended duration of commitment and 
increased use of heavy equipment, and that Operation Unified Protector and 
Operation Resolute Support are the most severe responses due to quantity of 
forces. For more comprehensive academic discourse to take place, additional raw 
data regarding NATO’s operations are necessary. 
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Chart 2. Measurements of Human Suffering  
 
Operation Target 
location of 
humanitarian 
support 
Total 
Population 
Year20  Total 
Displaced 
Persons  
Casualties  Total 
(to the 
nearest 
hundred 
thousand)  
Operation 
Allied 
Provider 
Somalia 8.9 million 2008 1.1 million  16,210 
(since 
December 
2006, no 
data exists 
for 2008 
alone) 
~ 1.1 
million21  
Operation 
Allied 
Protector  
Somalia    9.12 million 2009 1.3 million   2,041 ~1.3 
million 
22 
Operation 
Ocean 
Shield  
Somalia  9.12 million 2009 1.3 million  2,041 ~1.3 
million 
23 
Operation 
Unified 
Protector  
Libya  6.2 million  2011 435,000  21,49024 ~0.5 
million 
25 
Operation 
Resolute 
Support  
Afghanistan  33.7 million 2015 2.5 million  
 
3,545 ~ 2.5 
million26 
 
 
                                                 
20 The data here measures the number of persons displaced and number of casualties occurring 
during the year in which the NATO operation commenced, as it would be data for the year in 
which NATO analyzed and considered their severity of response.  
21 "The Human Rights Crisis in Somalia." Human Rights Watch. April 17, 2015. Accessed August 
8, 2018. https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/30/human-rights-crisis-somalia. 
22 "World Report 2009: Rights Trends in Somalia." Human Rights Watch. July 29, 2011. Accessed 
August 8, 2018. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009/country-chapters/somalia. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Variation in this estimate ranges from 2000 (World Health Organization) and 30,000 (National 
Transitional Council) 
25 Daw, Mohamed A., Abdallah El-Bouzedi, and Aghnaya A. Dau. "Libyan Armed Conflict 2011: 
Mortality, Injury and Population Displacement." African Journal of Emergency Medicine5, no. 3 (2015. 
26 "Afghan Casualties Hit Record High 11,000 in 2015 – UN Report | UN News." United 
Nations. Accessed August 09, 2018. https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/02/522212-afghan-
casualties-hit-record-high-11000-2015-un-report. 
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Analysis 
Based on this data, we can conclude that factors of civilian suffering bear little to 
no effect on NATO’s severity of response, and that no correlation, either positive 
nor negative, can be drawn from these variables. This departs from my hypothesis 
of a positive relationship. If it had been true that civilian suffering as defined in 
this paper were a primary consideration for NATO, then neither Operation 
Ocean Shield nor Operation Unified Protector would have involved such high 
figures in personnel and heavy equipment, and the Somalian crisis would have 
been addressed with much more severity, as it was the most critical humanitarian 
crisis at the time of Operation Allied Provider.27 Additionally, as NATO’s 
operations in the Gulf of Aden involved only maritime forces and did not 
interfere in the Somalian civil war (1990-present) at the ground level, it cannot be 
fairly established that NATO’s operations were in fact targeting the civilian crisis 
in that region. Of the three NATO anti-piracy missions analyzed, only Operation 
Allied Provider directly addressed the Somalian crisis by acting as a security force 
escorting the delivery of UN humanitarian goods. Both Operation Ocean Shield 
                                                 
27 "The Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia." ODI HPN. Accessed August 8, 2018. 
https://odihpn.org/magazine/editors-introduction-the-humanitarian-crisis-in-somalia/. 
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and Operation Allied Protector served uniquely to control and eliminate piracy in 
key international trading routes, and while regional stability contributes to global 
security, it cannot be claimed outright that these missions led to significant, 
intentional impact within Somalia, albeit that they did tangentially secure the 
delivery of humanitarian goods.   
 It may be claimed in objection that NATO’s responses, while they do not 
correspond linearly to factors of human suffering, are in fact directly proportional 
and appropriate in the resolution and containment of conflict – that NATO 
reactions are adequate and sufficient to resolve civilian crises, which is 
independent of calculations of displaced persons and casualties. Such a claim 
would negate the significance of my research altogether. I reject this claim - if it 
were true, then NATO’s operations would directly target the causes of human 
suffering, which would likely resemble a strong presence of ground troops in 
Somalia in conjunction with their anti-piracy missions. Furthermore, we would 
also observe a significant and lasting utility in regions of NATO’s involvement – 
the lack of these results indicates that NATO’s actions are in fact not ideally 
suited to humanitarian crises.  
 Additionally, claims that NATO’s responses do in fact impactfully 
consider factors of human suffering may fall silent when confronted with the 
reality that NATO is exceptionally selective with the security threats to which it 
responds – electing notably to remain silent in worldwide humanitarian crises 
such as the ongoing Rohingya genocide, the Nigerian famine, and the civil war in 
the DRC.28 Interpreted generously, it would be reasonable to claim that NATO’s 
resources are finite, and partitioning them across all worldwide crises would 
generate little utility. Nevertheless, it would likely be more reasonable to 
understand NATO’s decision to engage in a conflict to be the meta-level effect of 
individual national interests, and conclude that NATO takes action only when 
perceived benefits align at the member state level. Furthermore, as NATO 
operates under the framework of a regional alliance, there may also be little 
political appetite in operating in areas too removed from their borders.  
 
Conclusion  
With the adoption of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect in 2005, the 
concept of sovereignty was transported from the state to the international 
                                                 
28 "Ten Humanitarian Crises to Look out for in 2018." IRIN. March 02, 2018. Accessed August 
09, 2018. http://www.irinnews.org/feature/2018/01/01/ten-humanitarian-crises-look-out-2018. 
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community at large, but did not place a clear onus on a specific actor, leaving 
ambiguous the question of which agent is the most legitimate enforcer of R2P. 
The prevailing unstated admission holds that the UN, while it may in the future 
develop capacities sufficient for the execution of R2P, currently leaves vacant the 
place of an effective actor. Amongst regional alliances capable of undertaking 
peacekeeping operations, NATO, given US membership, has the greatest military 
capacities and hence may appear as an appropriate solution to the paucity of 
legitimate enforcers. However, given NATO’s significant military and political 
clout, it has little imperative to answer to a higher ethical authority, and hence 
little incentive to act upon R2P as the international community understands the 
doctrine. Given the findings of my research, it is evident that factors of human 
suffering do not contribute impactfully to NATO’s decision-making process, and 
although its missions may be analyzed under a framework of R2P and even 
considered successful, it is uncertain that NATO operates with appropriate 
attention to the doctrine so as to be considered its legitimate enforcer. This is not 
to posit that NATO is not nevertheless an agent of goodwill and peacekeeping on 
the international stage – for it remains the case that NATO’s mission objectives 
do support the establishment of global stability. Additionally, as a military alliance, 
NATO has limited capacity to act in regions where the primary need is for 
humanitarian assistance. Notwithstanding, the conceptualization of NATO as a 
legitimate enforcer of the R2P doctrine is inconsistent with NATO’s decision-
making process and its lack of prioritization of factors of human suffering. Albeit 
that NATO’s objectives clearly pursue international security, given its disregard 
for factors of human suffering, it cannot be fairly conceptualized as an ideal 
enforcer of R2P. 
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